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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's order denying his fifth 
motion for a new trial. On appeal he challenges only the district court's denial of 
his request for counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Smith was charged and convicted of grand theft after a trial. State v. 
Smith, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 467, Docket Nos. 35216 & 35604 (Idaho 
App., May 20, 2009). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Smith's judgment of 
conviction in an opinion issued May 20, 2009. !fl Smith filed for post-conviction 
relief, but his petition was dismissed. Smith v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 699, Docket No. 37819 (Idaho App., November 14, 2011 ). The dismissal 
was affirmed on appeal. !fl 
"On September 3, 2010, Smith filed a motion for a Faretta hearing, 
requesting a competency hearing to determine if he could proceed on the 
criminal case by representing himself." State v. Smith, 2011 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 715, Docket No. 38197, p. 2 (Idaho App., November 21, 2011). "On 
September 14, 2010, Smith also filed a motion to alter or amend a judgment .... " 
!fl The district court's denial of these motions was affirmed by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals. !fl 
"On January 19, 2012, Smith filed a pro se motion for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence." State v. Smith, 2013 Opinion No. 19, 
Docket No. 39704, p. 1 (Idaho App., March 28, 2013). "Smith's motion was 
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based on an assertion that he was mentally incompetent when he was tried for 
grand theft and that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a 
competency evaluation." ~ at p. 1 n. 1. This motion was properly denied as it 
was brought more than two years after final judgment, and therefore it was 
untimely and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. ~ at pp. 2-3. 
On March 11, 2013, Smith filed the current motion for a new trial. (R., pp. 
6-7.) The ground for the instant motion was "the district court's failure to hold a 
psychiatric examination based on the questions raised by previous evaluations." 
(R., p. 6. 1) Smith contended he was entitled to such an evaluation because his 
"psychiatric witness was excluded and his testimony, statute requires that the 
court order sua sponte another evaluation." (Id.) Smith also contended the 
failure to order an evaluation "tolled" the "statutory time limit" to file his motion. 
(Id.; see also R., pp. 8-14.) The relief he requested was to "immediately order a 
psychiatric evaluation and immediately set aside the conviction." (R., p. 7.) 
Smith also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Augmentation.) 
The district court ordered briefing on the issue of its jurisdiction to consider 
the new motion for a new trial. (Order Re Motion for New Trial (Augmentation).) 
Both Smith and the state filed briefing in response to the court's order. 
(Augmentation.) Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court denied 
both the motion for a new trial and the motion for appointment of counsel. (R., 
pp. 49-50.) Smith filed a timely notice of appeal from the order. (R., pp. 52-55.) 




Smith states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the court err in denying Mr. Smith's motion for 
appointment of counsel in light of the non-frivolous constitutional 
tolling argument made by him? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Smith failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 




Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying Smith's Request For Counsel To Represent Him On His Untimely New 
Trial Motion 
A. Introduction 
Smith contends the district court erred in denying him counsel because he 
asserted a viable claim that the limitation period should have been tolled because 
he has a mental disease and was taking prescribed psychotropic medication. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) Review of the record shows no basis for a claim that 
Smith was incompetent to pursue his right to access the court during the four 
years at issue. Smith's motion for a new trial was therefore not timely, and 
pursuing it would have been frivolous. Because the motion was frivolous, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the 
court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims 
presented are frivolous." Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. Smith Presented No Evidence And No Allegation That He Was Incapable 
Of Pursuing His Rights In Court During The Four Years Between The 
Remittitur And The Filing Of The Instant Motion 
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel in "post-conviction 
or post-commitment proceedings" unless the court determines that the 
proceeding is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
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would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).2 The district court determined that Smith's 
motion for new trial was a frivolous proceeding because the court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider it. (R., pp. 49-50.) This determination is supported by the 
law and the record. 
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 
(2003). "A motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered 
evidence may be made only before or within two (2) years after final judgment." 
I.C.R. 34.3 The Idaho Court of Appeals entered its remittitur in the appeal from 
the judgment in this case on June 17, 2009, and thus the judgment became final 
on that date. Smith, 2013 Opinion No. 19, at p. 2. Rule 34 extended the 
jurisdiction of the court to consider a motion for a new trial based on a claim of 
newly discovered evidence for two years, to June 17, 2011. Smith filed the 
motion at issue on March 11, 2013 (R., p. 6), almost four years after the 
judgment became final. The district court lacked jurisdiction because the motion 
2 Idaho Code section 19-852 was amended and its subsection renumbered 
effective July 1, 2013. The language relevant to this case is the same but now 
appears at I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). The numbering in place at the time of the district 
court's order is used in this brief. 
3 Smith's claim he was incompetent at trial cannot reasonably be framed as being 
based on newly discovered evidence. (R., pp. 6-7.) Nevertheless, because the 
district court applied the two-year limitation period without addressing whether it 
was actually applicable, the state will address the motion as if it were based on 
newly discovered evidence. 
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was filed well beyond the time the court's jurisdiction to consider the motion 
expired. 
Smith contends he asserted a viable issue as to whether he was 
incompetent, and thus the period to file the new trial motion was tolled, which 
issue required appointment of counsel. He argues that the tolling standard 
applicable to actions under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedures Act 
("UPCPA") should apply to new trial motions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) 
Assuming the applicability of this standard, Smith has failed to show that he 
presented a non-frivolous claim that he was incapable of timely filing his motion 
for a new trial due to mental illness. 
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows 
that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time." 
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable 
tolling theories in the context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v. 
State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
"extraordinary circumstances" and acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for 
post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the 
one-year limitation period of I. C. § 19-4902 may be tolled if an applicant is 
prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to courts, from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 
957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 
791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). "A petitioner's due process right is not 
violated by a statute of limitation bar unless he can show such an inability to file a 
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timely petition that he was denied any meaningful opportunity to present his post-
conviction claims." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained what a petitioner must show to 
prevail on a claim that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present claims 
due to mental illness, such that the limitation period tolls: 
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA 
to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented 
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness 
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to 
bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable 
of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Equitable tolling will 
apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness 
actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any 
period following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet 
the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the limitation period. 
Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140. 
Although Smith presented a claim he was incompetent at trial, he 
specifically asserted that he was suffering from the same incompetency at the 
time of his current motion. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Response to 
Court Orders, at pp. 3-4 (Augmentation).) According to Smith, his current claim 
is the same incompetency claim he has been asserting since 2007. (Id., at pp. 1-
2.) It is based on a mental illness he claims he has had since he was eight. (Id. 
at p. 5.) Furthermore, the record establishes that Smith was able to pursue an 
action in post-conviction and no less than three prior post-commitment motions 
(two of which were also based on claims of incompetency), all after the judgment 
in the criminal case became final. 
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There is no evidence in the record that Smith was not capable of pursuing 
his legal interests in the four years between the finality of the judgment and the 
filing of the current motion. He in fact filed a post-conviction petition and several 
motions in the criminal case. He asserts that he has had effectively the same 
mental illness (and same level of competence) for many years. Because there is 
no evidence or allegation that Smith was less competent in the four years 
preceding the filing of the current motion than he was at the time he filed it, any 
claim that Smith was prevented from filing his motion due to incapacity to 
meaningfully take advantage of his rights is frivolous. The district court therefore 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith's request for counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order denying 
appointment of counsel to represent Smith on his untimely motion for a new trial. 
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